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Abstract
This paper presents a multimarket spatial competition oligopoly
model for the Colombian deposit market, in line with the New Em-
pirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach. In this framework,
banks use price and non-price strategies to compete in the market,
which allows us to analyze the country and the regional competitive-
ness level. The theoretical model is applied to quarterly Colombian
data that covers the period between 1996 and 2005. Our results sug-
gest that, although the country deposit market appears to be more
competitive than the Nash equilibrium, there are some local areas
within the country that present evidence of market power.
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To justify the study of competition in the banking sector we need to describe
how banks behave in a competitive scenario. As Freixas and Rochet (1997)
mention, in perfect competition the optimal choice for banks is given by the
point where the intermediation margins are equal to the marginal manage-
ment cost. In this scenario, the behavior of a bank does not a®ect the market
equilibrium. In contrast, when a bank has market power it can a®ect prices,
which would lead to lower deposit rates and higher rates on loans given the
fact that the bank is maximizing its pro¯ts. In this context, part of the
consumer surplus is passed to the bank and e±ciency is lost by a reduction
in the volume of loans and deposits1.
Therefore, regulation concerned with limiting the creation, extension and
exploitation of market power is justi¯ed by the market failure. However, the
only guide for the optimal implementation of regulation is the competition
empirical studies that describe the characteristics of the relevant market, and
in this way, their importance is more than clari¯ed.
In Colombia, the existing empirical literature related with the study of
market competition in the banking system has traditionally followed two
tendencies. It has focused either on price or quantities to explain banks'
behavior, ignoring the possibility that banks consider other type of strategic
instruments; and on the other hand, it has always analyzed the market in a
national dimension without questioning if the conclusions obtained for the
national market are aplicable to a regional dimension.
In this paper, we specify a multimarket spatial competition oligopoly
model in which banks use price and non-price instruments to compete in the
market. In this context, we propose a two stage model in which banks choose
the optimal interest rate for the whole country in the ¯rst period and in the
second, given the optimal interest rate, they select the number of branches
they will open in each region. The purpose of the proposed model, is to
test for competition in regions and subregions within the country in order
to identify the local areas in which banks have market power. In particular
our hypothesis is that the traditional aggregated measures that have been
used in the Colombia to test for market power, leave aside many regional
particularities that may lead to wrong regulatory measures, meaning, that if
we analyze the market in a more disaggregated approximation we may get
di®erent results.
The paper is structured in ¯ve sections. The ¯rst section presents a brief
1As Canoy et al. (2001) propose e±ciency would consist in achieving a goal at its lowest
cost.
2overview of the international literature. The following section summarizes
the empirical Colombian literature related with the study of competition in
the banking sector. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model. Section 4
deals with the empirical implementation which concerns functional forms,
data, estimation techniques and results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 An overview of the international literature
The literature on the measurement of competition can be broadly divided
in two streams: the structural approach and the non-structural approach 2.
The structural approach follows the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
paradigm or the e±ciency hypothesis. The SCP suggests a relationship be-
tween concentration and competition in which high concentration is re°ected
in market power, more precisely, it investigates whether highly concentrated
markets cause collusive behavior among banks that will result in superior
performance. In contrast, the e±ciency hypothesis tests if the presence of
economies of scale enhances the greater e±ciency of large ¯rms 3. Although
a theoretical basis exists for this view, it has been criticized for its theoretical
de¯ciencies and because some empirical cases have shown that there can be
competitive conduct without regard of the number of ¯rms in the market.
In response, the New Empirical Industrial Organization paradigm (NEIO)
was originated. It consists of a non-structural approach based on the hy-
pothesis of contestability between ¯rms in the pro¯t maximization scenario
developed mainly under two di®erent methodologies: The Panzar and Rosse
[P-R] model and the Bresnahan and Lau model 4. The P-R method infers the
market structure on the basis of a reduced form revenue equation based on
cross section data. Market power is measured as the sum of the elasticities of
the reduced-form revenue with respect to input prices, which constitutes the
H statistic that re°ects ¯rms competitive behavior in the long run equilib-
rium 5. The authors prove that under monopoly, H is smaller or equal that
2See Bikker and Haaf (2000) and Levy and Micco (2003)
3For a detail survey of the authors that use this methodology see Schmalensee (1989)
and Gilbert (1984).
4See respectively, Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987).










where wk represent input prices and Ri represents the reduced-form revenue equation. See
Vesala (1995) for details of the formal derivation of the statistic.
3zero (H · 0), while in a competitive industry H takes a value of one (H = 1).
Thus, values between zero and one (0 < H < 1) indicate that the market
works under monopolistic competition. This methodology has been applied
in several studies in which the result of monopolistic competition tends to
predominate6.
On the other hand, Bresnahan and Lau estimate the degree of market
power of the average bank in the short run developing the methodology
employed by Iwata (1974). The authors measure the degree of competition
in a conjectural parameter (¸), which is de¯ned as the change in the output
of other ¯rms anticipated by the focus ¯rm in response to an initial change
in its own output7. Theory predicts a certain response from a monopolist
and no response for the competitive ¯rm. In this context, if the average ¯rm
operates under perfect competition the conjectural parameter must be zero
(¸ = 0), and in the extreme case of monopoly it would take the value of one
(¸ = 1). However, this analysis changes in a Cournot model in which the
conjectural variations must be nil given the independence of the ¯rms8.
Although the SCP and the NEIO streams have been the two traditional
approaches in the study of competition in the banking system, in recent
years, a new trend has been developing. This tendency, focuses on the idea
that banks compete also in a spatial dimension which incorporates more
than price or quantities as the strategic variables9. For instance, Chiappori,
Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier (1993) specify a model in which banks compete
simultaneously with interest rates and branches to analyze the e®ect of reg-
ulation, Barros (1997) proposes a spatial competition model to explain price
di®erences across banks in the deposit market and Kim and Vale (2001) set
up an oligopolistic model to test for the role of the branch network as a
6For the developed countries Bikker and Haaf (2000) show that the banking markets
in the industrial world are characterized by monopolistic competition. For the develop-
ing countries Levy and Micco (2003) and Gelos and Roldos (2002) found evidence of
monopolistic competition as well.
7Although Iwata was the ¯rst to present an empirical measure of a ¯rm's conjectural
variation the concept was introduced by Bowley (1924).
8Several studies have used this approach to identify the market structure in the bank-
ing system. For instance, Sha®er (1989,1993) applies it to the Canadian and American
¯nancial markets, Suonemin (1994) and Swank (1995) analyze a two product market in
the Finnish and the Dutch banking sectors, Bikker and Haaf (2000) found evidence of
perfect competition in the Euro area, Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) evaluated competition
in the Italian ¯nancial banking, and Canhoto (2004) ¯nds evidence of high market power
features in the Portuguese banking sector. Among other papers that use this approach,
some else worth mentioning are Berg and Kim (1994,1996), Frazer and Zakoohi (1998),
Hannan and Liang (1993) and Toolsema (2002).
9The ¯st one to introduce this idea was Salop (1979).
4non-price strategic variable in the Norway banking sector10.
3 Empirical literature for Colombia
Barajas, Salazar and Steiner (1999) was the ¯rst paper that tried to study the
market structure of the Colombian loan market. The authors use the Bres-
nahan and Lau methodology for two periods, a preliberalization (1974-1988)
and a postliberalization period (1992-1996). Their results show that the
Colombian loan market was not competitive throughout the ¯rst period al-
though it became signi¯cantly more competitive after the 1990s. Afterwards,
they apply the P-R approach ¯nding evidence of monopolistic competition
for domestic and private banks (H = 0:382), with domestic banks exhibiting
a lower degree of competition (H = 0:265) than foreign banks (H = 0:527),
specially after 1990s11.
Later, Levy and Micco (2003) apply the SCP approach and the P-R
methodology to measure the competition level in the banking sector of eight
Latin American countries, including Colombia12. They found that concentra-
tion appears to have no in°uence in competition, while foreign penetration
weakened it seriously in this area. For Colombia, they obtain evidence of
monopolistic competition although the Colombian banking sector appear to
be only more competitive than Argentina 13.
Mora (2004) uses a new measure of competition in which he divides the
conjectural parameter by the demand elasticity to evaluate the market power
for Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The estimations
show that in all of these countries the loan and deposit markets have an
oligopolistic structure. In particular, the paper reveals that Colombia is one
of the less competitive markets in Latin America14.
In a more recent work, Estrada (2005) follows two methodologies in his
study. In the ¯rst part, he applies the SCP paradigm using the Her¯ndahl-
Hirschman concentration index (HHI) concluding that in the Colombian ¯-
nancial system the level of concentration is not signi¯cantly high 15, and
later, in the second part, he employs the Bresnahan and Lau's method for
10See also Kim, Vivas and Morales (2003).
11See Barajas et al. [2000]
12Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, el Salvador, Mexico and Peru were analyzed as
well.
13The H statistic was between 0.57 and 0.59 for the regression with Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) and Weighted Least Squares (WLS), respectively.
14Colombia turned to be only more competitive than Costa Rica in both markets.
15The HHI is a convex function of the average weight of the ¯rms in the market, given
5the deposit market in which the results show that it is not characterized by
a collusive scenario.
Finally Salamanca (2005), employs the Bresnahan and Lau's approach to
analyze the Colombian market structure in the loan and deposit market using
a Bertrand model for the period 1994-2004. He concludes, that the deposit
market tends to be more competitive than the loan market. Particularly, the
deposit market appears to be more competitive than the Nash equilibrium,
while on the contrary, the loan market shows a less competitive behavior
close to a monopolistic competition structure.
To summarize, the existing empirical literature leaves clear three ideas:
First, that the Colombian banking sector is one of the less competitive mar-
kets of Latin America, second, that the deposit market is more competitive
than the loan market, and ¯nally, that the loan market presents a monop-
olistic competition market structure. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the
introduction, each of the aforementioned models focus traditionally in a na-
tional measure of the market and lets aside the very likely possibility that
banks employ non-price variables as strategic instruments.
This article intends to be a contribution in this research, focusing in the
evaluation of the competitive conditions within the regions for the Colom-
bian deposit market, for the 1996-2005 period, considering a framework in
which banks optimize their pro¯t taking into account spatial variables such
as branching network.
4 The Model
We specify a framework derived from a static partial equilibrium oligopoly
model inspired by earlier models developed in Freixas and Rochet (1997) and
Canhoto (2004). Under this perspective banks operate in the loan, deposit
and securities markets. In the loan and deposit markets there is product dif-
ferentiation but high substitution elasticity between products, which makes
bank's demand for loans and supply for deposits dependent on their own
interest rate and on the vector of the rivals' rates. There is separability






where si represents the share of the ¯rm i in the market. The index grows when the
number of ¯rms in the market decreases or when there are high di®erences in the ¯rms
size.
6securities market16.
We assume as well a two-stage model in which banks have two strategic
variables: interest rates and number of branches in each region. In this
context, each bank chooses their loan and deposit interest rates to satisfy
its objective function in the ¯rst period following a Bertrand model. For
the second period, given the optimal interest rate, each bank determines
the optimal number of branches for each region. More speci¯cally, each
bank establishes the same interest rate in all of its branches, which is a way
of maintaining the interrelations among di®erent regional markets in the
theoretical perspective17.
The Bertrand model was applied because as Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo,
and Verdier (1993) argue, prices should be considered as the main instrument
of competition between ¯nancial institutions.
4.1 First period
Given the assumptions mentioned before, each banks chooses the interest
rate that maximizes its national pro¯t function in the ¯rst period. In this










Di ¡ Ci(Di;Li;Si;ni) (4.1)
where Li, Si and Di represent respectively, the amount of loans, the net
holding of securities and the quantity of deposits received by the bank i, r
stands for the interest rate in each market, p is the reserve requirement rate,
m is the return on these reserves, ni represents the number of branches that
the i bank has in the whole country, Ci stands for the variable costs, which
are assumed to be separable for each activity.
The assumption about separability for the loan and deposit markets al-







¡i represents the vector of deposit rates set by the rivals in the market
and zi stands for other exogenous variables that a®ect the supply for deposits
16The assumption of separability between markets has been used widely in the literature.
For instance Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier (1993) and Barros (1997) use this
assumption to analyze the deposit market.
17In Colombia each bank establishes a reference deposit rate for the whole country.
Then, each branch of the bank has the possibility of ¯xing a rate that di®ers in a small
margin from the ¯xed rate. However, there is no existing data of these margins.
7of the bank i. In this context, the supply of deposits for each bank is deter-
mined by all the individual rivals' interest rates which constitutes in itself a
very complicated problem. To simplify it we employ Canhoto's methodology,












Given this de¯nition, theory states that the amount of deposits supplied by
the public to the bank i will increase if its own interest rate goes up and that
it will decrease if the weighted average of the rivals increases.
With the above speci¯cations for the deposit supply and the pro¯t func-
tion, the ¯rst order condition for the i bank with respect to the interest rate


















































) represents the conjectural
parameter of the ¯rm, de¯ned as the change in the interest rates of other
¯rms anticipated by the focus ¯rm in response to an initial change in its own
rate. As it can be seen in equations 4.4 and 4.5,ceteris paribus, the value of
this parameter de¯nes if the interest rate on deposits are higher or lower. In
this way, given that we expect that in a more competitive market the bank
i has higher rates on deposits while in a less competitive market the bank
has lower rates, ° will test for the competitive conditions of the market18.
More explicitly, the case where ° takes the value of zero (° = 0) represents
the Nash equilibrium 19. If a determined value of ° takes a negative value
18We expect that if interest rates are higher than the value they would take in the Nash
equilibrium banks are willing to sacri¯ce surplus to gain deposits, that behavior is in line
with a more competitive market, whereas, if interest rates are lower than the value they
would take in the Nash equilibrium, banks are capable of keeping higher surplus that they
take away from the depositors, that behavior would be consistent with a less competitive
market.
19In this scenario, the representative bank is not reacting to what it expects its com-
petitors will do, and therefore, the banks are in a situation where they will not bene¯t by
changing its strategy while the others keep their strategies unchanged.
8(° < 0) the interest rate on deposits is higher which would mean that we
are in a more competitive environment than the Nash equilibrium, on the
contrary, positive values of ° should be analyzed carefully. For values of °
that are bigger than one (° > 1), the interest rate of deposits is smaller than
the value it would take under Nash equilibrium, therefore, this scenario is
consistent with a collusive market structure. However, when ° is between
cero and one (0 < ° < 1), for simplicity, we may compare the value of the
interest rate for the Nash equilibrium (when ° = 0) with the value of the
interest rate obtained with the estimated ° value, to state if the interest rate
would be higher or lower, and in this way, determine if we are in a scenario
more or less competitive than the Nash equilibrium.
It is important to clarify the di®erence between the Nash and the com-
petitive equilibrium. On one hand, the Nash equilibrium is a situation char-
acterized by a set of strategies with the property that no player can bene¯t
by changing his strategy while the others keep their strategies unchanged.
On the other hand, a competitive equilibrium consists of a vector of prices
that clears the market, equating aggregate demand and supply. From this
de¯nitions, we may conclude that the Nash equilibrium is more realistic given
the fact that it allows for an outcome characterized by an equilibrium with
imperfect competition. Therefore, we use it as the reference situation.
Likewise, although the credit market is not of our interest in this paper,
it is important to take into account that banks would also choose the loan






where wi stands for the exogenous variables that a®ect the loan demand of
the bank i.
4.2 Second period
Once each bank has established the optimal interest rate in the whole terri-
tory, it proceeds to determine the optimal number of branches that it must











Dik ¡ Cik(Lik;Dik;Sik;nik) (4.7)
where rl¤
i and rd¤
i represent the optimal interest rates determined in the
¯rst period by each bank and nik is the number of ¯rms that the bank i has
in the k region.
9Within a particular area of the territory, we expect that banks with more
branches would have higher deposit supplies because individuals would have
bigger facilities for transactions or to withdraw money from the bank. In this
way, the deposit supply for the bank i would be related positively with its
own number of branches (nik) and negatively with the number of branches
that the rivals have in the k region (n¡ik). The above, explains that the




where zik represent the exogenous variables that a®ect the deposit supply for
the bank i in the k region.
From these expressions we derive the ¯rst order condition of the bank i
in each region k for the pro¯t maximization with respect to the number of
branches. The latter could be written as:
µ
r


























As in the ¯rst period, in this expression the parameter Á represents the
conjectural parameter of the bank i in the k region, which in this period is
de¯ned as the change in the number of branches of other ¯rms anticipated by
the focus ¯rm in response to an initial change in its own number of branches.
If this conduct parameter has a nil value (Á = 0) it would describe a scenario
consistent with the Nash equilibrium. If it has a positive value (Á > 0) it
would reveal a less competitive scenario than the Nash equilibrium, because
as it is shown in equation 4:9 and 4:10, it will indicate that the representative
bank is investing a less quantity of money per branch (which is interpreted as
a lower quality per branch, a lower service level). On the contrary, it would
indicate a scenario more competitive than the Nash equilibrium (Á < 0)
given that the representative bank has a higher cost per branch ( which is
interpreted as high quality per branch, a higher service level).
To summarize, the framework described above generates one ¯rst order
condition for each period derived from the interaction of the deposit sup-
ply and the marginal cost of the deposits in the pro¯t function. These two
functions would allow to test for banks' behavior within the regions, in par-
ticular, we would be able to determine the local areas in which banks have




The model is estimated in two stages that correspond to each of the periods
mentioned in the last section. The ¯rst period empirical implementation
follows closely that in Canhoto (2004), in this context, the speci¯cation of
the deposit supply and the marginal cost of the deposits is given by the
following expressions:









i = b0 + b1wli + b2wki + b3Di + ²i (5.2)
where gdp represents the gross domestic product of the whole area, emp
is the total number of employees of the bank i, wl and wk stand for the price
of labor and physical capital, respectively, and ¯nally "i and ²i represent the
error terms20. Theory predicts, ceteris paribus, that the deposit supply of the
bank i would depend positively of its own interest rate and of the gdp, while
on the contrary, it would be inversely related with the weighted average of the
rivals' rates. The number of employees is an exogenous variable that accounts
for the size of the ¯rms in the market and is expected to increase with the
amounts of deposits supplied from the individuals to the focus bank21. With
respect to the marginal costs, they are positively related with the price of
labor and physical capital, thus we will expect positive signs for a1 and a2.
On the other hand, the sign of a3 would depend of the returns of scale of the
bank i.
We specify the following equations for the second period empirical imple-
mentation:
Dik = c0 + c1r
d¤









ik = f0 + f1wlik + f2wkik + f3Dik + ºi (5.4)
In the case of the regional deposit supply the interest rate that the bank
chose in the ¯rst period is taken as given, expecting a positive sign for c1
taking into account that the interest rate has relevance at the regional level
20The stochastic errors are assumed to be normally distributed.
21In order to overcome the NEIO assumption that says that marginal cost cannot be
directly observed within the ¯rms behavior we would not estimate it in a independent way.
See Canhoto (2004) and Bresnahan (1982).
11as well. As pointed out in a previous section, the amount of deposits in
each region is expected to increase with the number of branches and, on the
contrary, is expected to decline if the rivals of the focus bank set up more
branches. As in the ¯rst period, we include the general domestic product
because it explains important °uctuations of the individuals wealth and of
their deposits, and ¯nally, the variable population per square kilometer was
included to control for region size.
For the regional marginal costs of the bank i the same variables of the
¯rst period were taken, however, now they stand for a regional dimension.
In this way, the expected signs of the parameters are positive for f1 and f2.
5.2 Sample and data
The data employed for the estimation of the model covers the period between
January 1994 and September 2005, and has a quarterly frequency obtained
from the information published by the Colombian Financial Superintendency
22. The sample includes 26 banks, that account for the 94;4 percent of the
deposit Colombian banking system throughout the indicated period.
Proxy variables were constructed for the input prices. The labor price
was calculated by dividing labor expenditures by the number of employees
for each bank and the capital price was represented by the sum of administra-
tive expenditures, capital depreciation and the income tax payed divided by
the total ¯xed assets. On the other hand, the deposit interest rate was repre-
sented by the ratio between the interest expenditures and the total amount
of deposits taken from the bank's balance sheets and the loss and pro¯t ac-
counts23. For the regional and subregional input prices we took the product
of a constructed weight for each bank in each area and the country input
prices. Additionally, the securities market rate is measured by the interbank
money market rate24.
Finally, information concerning the gross domestic product, the inhabi-
tants and the square kilometers of each local market needed to estimate the
demand and cost functions was taken from the information published by the
National Department of Statistics (DANE) and the Colombian atlas of the
geographical institution Agust¶ ³n Codazzi for 2005.
22The information is available in the web page of the Financial Superintendency:
http://www.super¯nanciera.gov.co/
23This type of estimation for the interest rates has been applied widely in empirical
literature, see Barajas, Salazar (2000), Reyes (2004), Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) and
Salamanca (2005).
24We asume as well that the reserve requirement rate tends to zero, which would mean
that m=0.
12Table 1: Spatial distribution for regions
Year
Regions 1996 2005
Bra /100,000 hab. Population Bra /100,000 hab. Population
Andean 5.13 23052579 6.31 26802092
Paci¯c 4.10 6977005 4.62 8092164
Orinoquia 3.74 1177549 6.84 1475815
Caribean 3.16 6745027 4.21 7987971
Amazonic 1.98 910563 3.44 1134102
5.3 Data analysis
Given that for the ¯rst time there is available data to describe the banking
system throughout the country, we spend this subsection analyzing it. More
speci¯cally, we study the information concerning the spatial concentration
of banks and the weight of each area in the country deposit market to get a
more accurate characterization of the Colombian scenario.
In order to examine these characteristics we divide the country in regions
and subregions. For the regional division we follow traditional geography
which divides the country in ¯ve areas: Amazonic, Orinoquia, Paci¯c, Car-
ribean and Andean. On the other hand, to obtain the subregions we used
the political division of the country which splits Colombia in 32 areas and
the capital city, Bogot¶ a (see Figure 1).
To analyze the spatial concentration of banks we use the total number of
branches per a 100,000 habitants as a measure. In ¯rst place, we calculate
it for the regional scenario. As Table 1 shows, the variable reveals that the
area with the highest branch concentration for 1996 was the Andean (5.13),
followed in order by the Paci¯c (4.1), Caribbean (3.74) and Amazonic (1.98)
regions. However, for 2005, the order changes and Orinoquia takes the ¯rst
place, duplicating the value that it had in the ¯rst year of study (6.84). This
table shows as well, the poor ¯nancial development of the Amazonic region,
that had the lowest number of branches per habitant in the country through
the whole period in study.
Further, we calculate the variable for each of the subregions for 1996 and
2005, the results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. On one hand, Table 2
shows that the departments with more branches per habitant for 1996 were
Atl¶ antico (37.18), San Andr¶ es (12.17) and Bogot¶ a (8.51), while the least
13Figure 1: Political and regional division of Colombia
14Figure 2: Distribution of deposits for each region
concentrated were Choc¶ o (0.74), Guaviare (0.95) and Putumayo (1.35). On
the other hand, Table 3, reveals that in 2005 the subregions with the highest
values were in order Nari~ no (70.74), Bogot¶ a (52.11) and Santander (47.26),
whereas, the ones with the lower values were Choc¶ o (0.29), Putumayo (0.21)
and Vaup¶ es (0.01).
When we check for the banks with the higher number of branches within
the country, we found that the Banco de Bogot¶ a (343), Bancaf¶ e (297) and
Banco Ganadero (163) had the biggest numbers for 1996. Nevertheless, for
2005, the banks that had more branches all around the country were the
Banco Agrario (723), Bancolombia (379) and the Banco de Bogot¶ a (354).
On second place, to analyze the weigh of each area in the country deposit
market we employ a simple ratio of the total deposits of the area and the total
deposits of the country. As we did for the number of branches per 100,000
habitants we also calculated this variable for the regional and subregional
dimensions.
For the regional division, as Figure 2 presents, in 1996 the Andean re-
gion accounted for for 75 percent of the deposit market, while the Paci¯c,
Caribbean and Orinoquia regions stand for the 12, 10 and 2 percent of the
market, respectively. For 2005, the scenario is quite the same given that
the Andean region represents 76 percent, and the Paci¯c, Caribbean and
Orinoquia accounted for a 12, 8 and 3 percent of the market. It is worth
mentioning that the Amazonic region reduced its market participation from
3 to almost zero percent between these two years.
More deeply, the weigh of each department inside each of the regions is
presented in Figure 3. For the Amazonic region, we found that the most
important subregions are Caqueta, which reduced its share in the market
between 1996 and 2005, and Putumayo, area that gain importance through
15Table 2: Spatial distribution for departments in 1996
Region Subregion Population Bran/ 100,000 Hab


























Paci¯c CAUCA 1171747 1.45
CHOCO 403266 0.74
NARI~ NO 1513005 1.45
VALLE 3888987 6.27
San Andres SAN ANDRES 65750 12.17
16Table 3: Spatial distribution for departments in 2005
Region Subregion Population Bran/100,000 Hab




























Paci¯c CAUCA 1775972.807 2.76
CHOCO 4532378 0.29
NARI~ NO 83403 70.74
VALLE 4532378 5.58
San Andres SAN ANDRES 83403 9.59
17Table 4: Colombian Banking: Sample descriptive statistics for 1996 and 2005
1996 2005
Average Median Average Median
Deposits 445973323.4 313469448.5 3137285066 1943985681
wl 37549.06135 22274.36581 46918.11174 20275.22707
wk 2.666434695 2.647224659 3.806171451 3.514046784
rd 0.186013163 0.188642616 0.052052311 0.050732414
Branches 79.63636364 27 170 123
the period in study. On the Orinoquia region for 2005, the biggest markets
were Meta and Casanare while for the Carribean region Atl¶ antico was the
most important. Finally, in the Andean region the most relevant market in
2005 was Bogot¶ a accounting for 64 percent.
For a brief summary of the statistical analysis of the aggregated variables
applied in the model estimation see Table 4.
18Figure 3: Distribution of deposits within each region
195.4 Estimation
As pointed out the model was estimated in two stages, one concerning each
period. In both periods, time-series and cross section data were pooled25. In
the ¯rst period, we used aggregated data for the whole country, and for the
second period, we made two estimations. In part A of the second period we
divide the country in ¯ve regions and in part B the country was divided in
33 subregions, see Table 5.
For the ¯rst period we estimate the equation that speci¯es the ¯rst order
condition for the deposit interest rate (4:4) and the demand equation (5:1)
by full information maximum likelihood method, where the marginal cost
functional form was given by equation 5:2.
Using the same method, for the second period we estimate as well the ¯rst
order condition for the number of branches in each local market (4:9), and
the demand equation (5:3) for each of the regions and subregions, where the
functional form for the regional marginal cost was represented by equation
5:4.
5.5 Results
Tables 6, 7,8 and 9 present the results of the complete estimation of the two
period model. For the ¯rst period (Table 6) we obtained parameters that are
statistically signi¯cant and consistent with the microeconomic theory. For
the deposit supply, the partial derivative with respect to the own interest rate
is positive, while the partial derivative with respect to the weighted average
of the rivals interest rate is negative. Additionally, the relation between the
deposit supply and the general domestic product is positive, and the number
of employees, that was used as a proxy of the ¯rms' size, reveals that larger
¯rms face bigger deposit supply. On the other hand, for the marginal cost
function the results are as well satisfactory showing positive signs for b1, b2
and b3.
For this estimation, the conjectural parameter ° rejected the existence
of market power in the deposit market, given that the estimate was less
than zero. This result is in line with the empirical research made for the
Colombian deposit market in which Estrada (2005) and Salamanca (2005)
have found evidence of a market structure more competitive than the Nash
equilibrium for the deposit market26.
25This estimation follows the procedure applied in Canhoto (2004).
26In the international literature Bikker and Haaf (2000) found also evidence of compet-
itive behavior for the deposit market in a group of European countries.
20Table 5: Territory divisions taken for the estimation
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21Table 6: Estimation results for the ¯rst period
Parameters Estimate St. Error T-statistic p-value
a0 3.91E+08 4.79E+08 0.817193 0.414
a1 1.62E+09 7.61E+08 2.13157 0.033
a2 -1.22E+10 1.03E+09 -11.9066 0.000
a3 55.8835 20.0602 2.78579 0.005
a4 478833 21222.9 22.5621 0.000
b0 -0.99722 0.0892 -11.1796 0.000
b1 7.83E-03 1.76E-03 4.43983 0.000
b2 0.016598 4.22E-03 3.93026 0.000
b3 0.037086 4.21E-03 8.80852 0.000
° -2.6108 0.395549 -6.60044 0.000
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i = b0 + b1wli + b2wki + b3Di + ²i (5.7)
As it was pointed out the equations were estimated by full information maximum likelihood
using TSP 4.5.
22In this same way, the results for the estimation of the part A of the
second period, in which the country was divided in ¯ve regions, are presented
in Table 7. We made two estimations for the Andean region, Andean 1
includes the capital city of the country and Andean 2 does not includes it.
For this division we found nonsigni¯cant parameters for the Amazonas and
the Orinoquia regions, which could be explained by the size of the markets
and its poor development. For the other regions, most of the parameters were
signi¯cant and showed the expected signs27. With respect to the conjectural
parameters (Á), we found that all the regions appear to have competitive
markets 28. More speci¯cally, the Caribbean region appeared to have the
lower conjectural parameters (Á = ¡1023:81), followed by the Paci¯c (Á =
¡962:381) and Andean1 (Á = ¡640:028).
The results concerning the estimation of the second period in a more
disaggregated approach are presented in Tables 8 and 9. For this phase,
the parameters could not be estimated or were nonsigni¯cant for Arauca,
Casanare, Guain¶ ³a, Choc¶ o, Guaviare, Quind¶ ³o, Sucre, Tolima, Vaup¶ es, Meta,
Huila y Putumayo. For the rest of the subregions the conjectural parameters
were signi¯cant and signs were consistent with theory. In this estimation
we found some areas that present evidence of market power. More speci¯-
cally, we found that Caquet¶ a (Á = 2569), Cauca (Á = 1848) and Norte de
Santander(Á = 793) are the less competitive subregions of the country.
Summarizing, although we found evidence of a competitive national de-
posit market, when we analyze the market in a more disaggregated approx-
imation we found that there are some subregions that present evidence of
market power. In particular, we found that Caquet¶ a, Cauca and Norte de
Santander present collusive market structures in their deposit markets. In
this context, within these regions regulation policies should be carefully ad-
dressed to avoid bigger market structure problems, or even better, to improve
competitive conditions.
Finally, this results prove that market structure is not properly analyzed
in very big markets were the results are too general and may lead to wrong
regulatory measures.
27There are some problems with the signs of some parameters in the marginal costs.
However, problems that concern incoherence of the coe±cients of the marginal costs are
common in the literature of conjectural parameters.
28Excluding Orinoquia and Amazonas in which Á was not signi¯cant.
23Table 7: Estimation results for the second period. Part A
Amazonic Andean 1 Andean 2
Parameters Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
c0 -353255000 0.000 -15951300000 0.000 -15013400000 0.000
c1 -123417000 0.000 3640080000 0.000 6312990000 0.000
c2 19638.3 0.073 3992670 0.000 2298570 0.000
c3 -2438440 0.000 -381673 0.000 -251509 0.000
c4 1.18294 0.232 49.0959 0.005 40.5938 0.004
c5 171422000 0.000 137024000 0.000 144218000 0.000
f0 -73.0769 0.986 -0.17727 0.000 -0.158849 0.000
f1 -7.55544E-07 0.986 5.9972E-11 0.000 1.75692E-10 0.000
f2 0.050331 0.986 -9.37909E-09 0.062 -7.00704E-08 0.493
f3 -621.666 0.986 -0.000963456 0.684 -0.062934 0.000
Á -0.00308063 0.996 -640.028 0.012 -655.235 0.000
Caribbean Orinoquia Paci¯c
Parameters Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
c0 -2187690000 0.000 -3838010000 0.000 -7430000000 0.000
c1 949286000 0.000 3656240000 0.000 4180000000 0.000
c2 5.05E+05 0.000 218439 0.000 610217 0.000
c3 -1.70E+05 0.000 -70935.7 0.039 -193789 0.003
c4 7.49424 0.008 5.43705 0.497 14.1772 0.079
c5 3.60E+07 0.000 639067000 0.000 117000000 0.000
f0 -0.170694 0.000 -0.150246 0.000 -0.189509 0.000
f1 5.54E-10 0.000 1.70501E-09 0.000 5.87E-10 0.000
f2 -1.55E-07 0.039 -6.53394E-07 0.889 0.000000382 0.066
f3 -0.073643 0.000 -0.833892 0.000 -0.124972 0.000
Á -1023.81 0.000 -4841.54 0.186 -962.381 0.000
The estimated equations were:
µ
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ik = f0 + f1wlik + f2wkik + f3Dik + ºi (5.10)
As it was pointed out the equations were estimated by full information maximum likelihood
using TSP 4.5.
24Table 8: Estimation results for the second period, part B
Department c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
Amazonas -2.40E+08 3.01E+08 NE 881994 0.149872 **3.3E+08
Antioquia *-1.8E+10 *1.2E+10 *5758330 *-241150 **33.2666 *1.9E+08
Arauca -9.81E+09 1.50E+10 1.60E+06 -1.98E+06 3.18E+01 7.41E+08
Atlantico *-2.6E+08 *1.9E+08 *5674000 *-329296 0.932553 *3629370
Bogota *-7.3E+09 *2.8E+09 *12257800 *-700903 **24.3169 *1899800
Bolivar *-5.8E+08 *3.6E+08 *1526000 -47051.3 *2.16744 *6187480
Boyaca *-3.1E+09 *7.0E+08 *2121770 *-220286 2.8152 *51362900
Caldas *-9.3E+08 *3.8E+08 *5187030 -46034.3 *1.94209 *6071100
Caqueta *-1.1E+08 *3.7E+07 *513298 113611 0.310923 *23278400
Casanare *-1.6E+13 *1.9E+13 340209 -85781 63355.5 1.93E+12
Cauca *-5.8E+08 *3.3E+08 *2155520 *138265 2.01306 *12148100
Cesar *-3.1E+09 *1.2E+08 *2359800 *-300152 *0.945732 *7243140
Choco -1.13E+10 2.83E+09 604323 906076 5.70251 1.25E+09
Cordoba *-4.2E+09 *2.1E+09 *1833920 *-280249 5.746 *73730600
Cundinamarca *-2.8E+09 *2.1E+09 *2032240 *-270290 *7.82205 *27773700
Guainia 4.51E+09 -1.98E+10 NE -5.55E+06 -44.3583 -5.26E+09
Guajira *-1.3E+09 *8.4E+08 *3034290 *-1471290 2.5893 *52676800
Guaviare -2.79E+08 **3.6E+08 NE 1.08E+07 1.86025 9.78E+07
Huila *-5.5E+08 *1.5E+08 *909407 **-77094.7 *1.39148 *11355100
Magdalena *-2.9E+08 *1.2E+08 *2025630 *-155761 *1.01577 *4957050
Meta *-1.6E+08 -7.09E+07 64280.8 1381.43 -1.46073 *28210500
N. de Santander *-3.7E+08 *2.1E+08 *2543610 226277 1.02662 *5426890
Nari~ no -3.57E+09 2.75E+09 *596128 -22548.4 7.65294 6.32E+07
Putumayo *-1.6E+08 -1.42E+08 *-2697530 -718168 1.33806 *14268200
Quindio -3.03E+10 2.80E+10 170835 -3.81E+04 62.862 8.41E+07
Risaralda *-3.7E+08 *1.4E+08 *5797340 *-226826 *0.82286 *1528390
Santander *-1.4E+10 *1.2E+10 *2207590 *-881473 *29.2664 *271441000
Sucre *4.3E+13 -1.15E+14 68507.1 -2.04E-05 *-1368370 -638617
Tolima -5.71E+11 8.66E+10 *1207020 -194246 253.833 1.01E+10
Valle *-4.8E+09 *2.6E+09 *5288270 *-307278 *10.0526 *23266300
Vaupes 3.06E+09 -1.48E+10 NE NE -27.8194 -3.64E+09
Vichada *-2.5+E08 *3.7E+08 -2.40E+06 5.98E+06 -1.04607 *305058000
The estimated equations are the same of Table 3 and they were estimated by full informa-
tion maximum likelihood using TSP 4.5. The symbols ¤ and ¤¤ stand for signi¯cance of
5 and 10 percent, respectively. On the other hand the NE letters mean that the parameter
couldn't be estimated.
25Table 9: Estimation results for the second period, part B
Department f0 f1 f2 f3 Ã
Amazonas **4585150 5234.24 1.20E+08 *-0.854899 NE
Antioquia *-0.161108 *2.01295E-06 *-0.604809 *1.00212E-09 **-1253.02
Arauca *-0.138958 -1.95E-05 *-1.16669 *3.57453E-09 -97.2559
Atlantico *-0.157279 *-0.400559E-07 *-0.079261 *1.07066E-09 *-460.717
Bogota *-0.177302 **-9.22785E-09 -1.04E-03 *9.5709E-11 *-399.093
Bolivar *-0.21762 -4.36E-08 *-0.109921 *3.81219E-19 *-3683.01
Boyaca *-0.134089 *-1.33349E-05 *-0.410156 *1.47714E-09 *-928.902
Caldas *-0.128577 1.52E-07 *1.52078E-07 *1.02645E-09 *-2649.84
Caqueta *-0.187033 *-0.0000563726 6.68E-02 *8.17598E-09 *2569.62
Casanare -0.269125 -1.91E-04 -5.94347 1.18E-08 -8527.9
Cauca *-0.152278 *-0.0000126883 *-0.498274 *2.83899E-09 *1848.01
Cesar *-0.150596 *-0.0000164335 *-0.716753 *3.54418E-09 *-822.75
Choco *-0.188187 -8.30E-06 -1.52325 *7.9E-09 376.096
Cordoba *-0.170218 -8.82E-06 *-3.65047 *7.02E-09 *-872.336
Cundinamarca *-0.157036 *-0.00000245623 *-0.328134 *1.5E-09 *-993.436
Guainia -3.15E+08 -275714 -1.28E+10 33.3261 NE
Guajira *-0.127416 *-0.0000873574 *-2.56471 *4.9E-09 *-194.757
Guaviare 7.77E+06 4181.19 4.49E+07 *-0.639803 NE
Huila *-0.154926 *-0.0000190607 *-0.24298 *2.9E-09 -6113.07
Magdalena *-0.184234 *-0.00000710101 -0.033951 *4.7E-09 **-2401.99
Meta -4.04133 2.84E-04 -36.8656 -8.55E-08 189.064
N. de Santander *-0.174544 *-0.00000303999 *-0.508143 *2.82197E-09 *793.597
Nari~ no *-0.170376 *0.0000026164 *-0.747875 *3.01824E-09 *-8932.56
Putumayo -0.349578 -3.09E-03 42.1371 1.53E-07 -3.00581
Quindio *-0.085774 *0.0000469452 *-3.50385 *2.29446E-09 *-2053.27
Risaralda *-0.146353 -1.18E-07 -0.021445 *9.76345E-10 *-481.207
Santander *-0.178559 *0.00000602752 *-0.763949 *2.03916E-09 *-238.119
Sucre -1.36E+09 -733.949 -2.88E+07 77.5182 -8.46E+13
Tolima 1.79731 4.65E-05 -17.4433 1.69E-08 -12009
Valle *-0.181632 *0.000000328566 *-0.106415 *6.48948E-10 *-578.46
Vaupes -2.95E+08 65414.1 -9.73E+09 22.0264 NE
Vichada -0.122635 -5.10E-04 -14.8492 1.53E-08 -32.1951
The estimated equations are the same of Table 3 and they were estimated by full informa-
tion maximum likelihood using TSP 4.5. The symbols ¤ and ¤¤ stand for signi¯cance of
5 and 10 percent, respectively. On the other hand the NE letters mean that the parameter
couldn't be estimated.
266 Concluding comments
In this paper we develop a multimarket spatial competition oligopoly model
in which banks compete with price (interest rates) and non price (branches)
variables in the deposit market. In this context, each bank chooses the opti-
mal interest rate that it will ¯x for all the country in a ¯rst period, and in a
second period given that interest rate, each bank chooses the optimal number
of branches that it should open in each region of the country to maximize
its pro¯t function. For the second period, we take two approximations. In
part A we divide the country in 5 regions and then in the other approach we
divide it in 33 subregions (part B).
The purpose of the proposed model was to test for competitive conditions
in a more disaggregated approach, in order to state if the conclusions obtained
by studying each region and subregion of the country are di®erent from the
ones obtained by the analysis of the whole national markets.
The theoretical model was applied to quarterly data that covers the 1996-
2005 period. The data was pooled and the estimation was made by full
information maximum likelihood for each period.
Our empirical results for the ¯rst period reveal, that the deposit market
in the whole country is characterized by a competitive market structure. In
this same way the results for the part A of the second period, show that
deposit market of the Caribbean, Paci¯c and Andean are as well competitive
markets. However in the estimation of part B of the second period, we found
that there are some local areas that present evidence of market power. In
particular, we identify three critical markets: Caquet¶ a, Cauca and N. de
Santander.
In this way, we suggest that regulation policies should be carefully ad-
dressed in these three critical markets to avoid bigger competition problems.
Additionally, from this results we were able to prove that the market struc-
ture is not properly measure in big markets were the results are too general
and may lead to wrong regulatory measures.
Finally we must say, that this work opens new questions for the research
area. For instance, new studies should try to explain why banks tend to
agglomerate in some regions leaving aside other important areas.
27References
Angelini, P., and Cetorelli, N. (2000). Bank competition and regulatory re-
form: the case of the Italian banking industry. Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago.
Barajas A., Salazar, N. and Steiner, R. (1999). Interest spreads in banking
in Colombia: 1974-1996. Sta® Papers, International Monetary Fund.. Vol.
46.
Barajas, Salazar and Steiner (2000). The impact of liberalization and for-
eign investment in Colombia's ¯nancial sector. Journal of Development
Economics. Vol.63, pp. 157-196.
Barros, P. (1997). Multimarket competition in banking, with an example
from the Portuguese market International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion. Vol.17, pp. 335-352.
Berg S. A., and Kim M., (1994). Oligopolistic interdependence and the struc-
ture of production in banking: An empirical evaluation. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking. Vol.26 pp. 309-322.
Berg S. A., and Kim M., (1996). Banks as multioutput oligopolies: An empir-
ical evaluation of the retail and corporate banking markets. Federal reserve
bank of Chicago.
Bikker J. A., and Haaf, K.(2000). Competition, concentration and their rela-
tionship: An empirical analysis of the banking industry. Economic Letters.
Vol.10, pp. 87-92.
Bowley, A. (1924). The mathematical groundwork of economics. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Bresnahan, T. (1982). The oligopoly solution concept identi¯ed. Economic
Letters Vol.10, pp. 87-92.
Cabral, L.(1995).Conjectural variations as a reduced form. Economic Letters.
Vol. 49, pp. 397-402.
Canhoto, A.(2004). Portuguese banking: A structural model of competition
in the deposti market. Review of ¯nancial economics. Vol. 13, pp. 41-63.
Canoy, M., Dijik, M., Lemmen, J., Mooji, D., R., and Weigand, J.(2001).
Competition and stability in banking. Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis.
28Chiappori, P. A., D. Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier D., (1993). Spatial competi-
tion in the banking system: Localization, cross subsidies and the regulation
of deposit rates. European Economic Review. Vol. 39, pp. 889-918.
Estrada, D.(2005). Efectos de las fusiones sobre el sector ¯nanciero colom-
biano. Banco de la Rep¶ ublica de Colombia.
Frazer and Zakoohi (1998). Geographical deregulation in the U.S. banking
markets.Financial Review. Vol.33, pp.85.
Freixas, X., and Rochet, J., (1997). Microeconomics of banking.Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Frisch, R. (1951). Annual survey of economic theory International Economic
Papers. Vol. 1, pp. 23-36.
Gelos G., and Roldos J.(2002). Consolidation and market structure in emerg-
ing markets banking systems. IMF. No.186
Gilbert A.(1984). Bank market structure and competition.Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking. Vol. 16, pp. 205-218
Hannan T., And Liang, (1993). Inferring market power from time series
data.International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 11,No.4.
Iwata, G.(1974). Measurement of conjectural variations in
olipoly.Econometrica. Vol. 42, No. 5, pp.947-966.
Kim, M., and Vale, M.(2001). Non-price strategic behavior: the case of
bank branches.International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 19,
pp. 1583-1602.
Kim, M., Vivas, A. L., and Morales A.(2003). Multistrategic spatial compe-
tition with application to banking. University of Malaga.
Lau, L. (1982). On identifyng the degree of competitiveness from industry
price and industrial data.Economic Letters. Vol.10, pp. 93-99.
Levy, E., and Micco, A.(2003). Concentration and foregin penetration in
Latin American banking sectors: Impact on competition and risk. Escuela
de negocios. Universidad Torcuatto Di Tella.
Mora, H. (2004). E¯ciencia de los sistemas bancarios de los pa¶ ³ses miembros
del FLAR. FLAR.
29Neven, D., and Roller, L.(1999). An aggregate structural model of competi-
tion in the European banking industry.International Journal of Industrial
Organization. Vol.17, pp. 1059-1074.
Panzar, J., C., and Rosee, J., N.(1987). Testing for monopoly equilib-
rium.Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol.35, pp. 443-456.
Reyes, C.(2004). El poder de mercado de la banca privada colombiana. Mag-
ister Thesys, Universidad de los Andes.
Salop, S.(1979). Monopolistic competition with outside goods.The Bell Jour-
nal of Economics. Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 141-156.
Schmalensee, R. (1989). Good Regulatory Regimes. Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics. Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 417-436.
Salamanca, D.,(2005). Competencia en los mercados de credito y depositos
en Colombia: aplicacion de un modelo de oligopolio ¯jador de precios.
Universidad de los Andes.
Sha®er, S.(1989). Competition in the US banking industry Economic Letters.
Vol. 29, pp.321.
Sha®er, S.(1993). A test of competition in Canadian banking. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking. Vol. 25, pp.49-61.
Swank, J.(1995). Oligopoly in loan and deposit markets: An econometric
application to the Netherlans. De Economist. Vol. 143, pp.353-366.
Suonemin, N.(1994). Measuring competition in banking: A two product
model.Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Vol. 96, pp.95-110.
Toolsema L.,(2002). Competition in the Dutch consumer credit mar-
ket.Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol. 26.
Uchida, H., y Tsutsui, Y., (2005). Has competition in the Japanese banking
sector improved?. Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol. 29.
Vesala J., (1995). Testing competition in banking: behavioral evidence from
Finland. Bank of Finland Studies.
30